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Tax Expenditures to Limit the Growth of Carbon Emissions in Canada: 
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David G. Duff* and E. Ian Wiebe* 
 
2009 
 
I. Introduction 
First used by then Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy Stanley 
Surrey in 1967,1 the concept of tax expenditures refers to aspects of tax legislation that 
are designed not to implement the specific tax itself, but instead to encourage various 
social and economic activities by reducing the amount of tax otherwise payable by 
taxpayers who engage in these activities. Observing that these tax incentives are 
functionally equivalent to government spending programs, Surrey argued that the U.S. 
federal income tax actually consists of two parts: 
one part comprises the structural provisions necessary to implement the income 
tax on individual and corporate net income; the second part comprises a system of 
tax expenditures under which Governmental financial assistance programs are 
carried out through special tax provisions rather than through direct Government 
expenditures.2 
 
While most tax expenditure literature has tended to focus on the income tax, not 
consumption taxes,3 the same distinction could also be drawn for broad-based 
consumption taxes, such as retail sales taxes or value-added taxes.4 For more narrowly 
                                                
* Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. 
* J.D. Student, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia 
1 Stanley S. Surrey, Excerpts from remarks before The Money Marketeers on The U.S. Income Tax System 
– The Need for a Full Accounting, (November 15, 1967), in United States Department of Treasury, Annual 
Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 
1968, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969) at 322. 
2 Stanley S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973) at 6. 
3 Since the tax expenditure concept and most of the tax expenditure literature is American in origin, this 
focus is not surprising, since the U.S. federal government does not collect a broad-based consumption tax.  
4 Stanley S. Surrey and Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1973) at 238. 
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based excise taxes, on the other hand, Surrey suggested that tax expenditures could not 
exist.5 
Although the mere identification of a particular tax provision as a tax expenditure 
need not necessarily imply a normative judgment regarding its merits, in practice tax 
expenditure analysis has typically been critical of tax expenditures for two general 
reasons. First, on the grounds that they are generally unlimited in duration, without any 
budgetary ceiling, subject to limited legislative oversight, administered by the revenue 
authority rather than the government department that would otherwise be responsible for 
a direct spending program,6 and poorly targeted to the kinds of marginal decisions that 
they are intended to affect,7 tax expenditures are often criticized as a wasteful form of 
government spending.8 Second, on the basis that they increase the complexity of the tax 
system,9 distort economic decisions and necessitate higher tax rates to compensate for 
foregone revenues,10 and provide “upside-down” subsidies when delivered in the form of 
deductions or exemptions within a progressive income tax,11 tax expenditures are also 
criticized as a questionable approach to tax policy – violating traditional tax policy 
principles of simplicity, efficiency and equity.12 
                                                
5 Ibid. at 233, stating that “[s]pecial excise taxes, being inherently limited in scope, involve no normative 
provisions and thus are not candidates for such analysis.” 
6 Stanley S. Surrey, “Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with 
Direct Government Expenditures” (1970), 83 Harvard Law Review 705 at 728-31. 
7 Ibid. at 719-20, suggesting that "tax incentives are wasteful because some of the tax benefits go to 
taxpayers for activities which they would have performed without the benefits.” While the same criticism 
may also be levied against government subsidies as a whole, it is often argued that direct expenditures can 
be more easily targeted to the kinds of marginal activities that the subsidy is intended to stimulate. 
8 Surrey and McDaniel, supra note 4 at 32-37. 
9 Ibid. at 26, emphasizing that “[t]ax simplification will be impossible if these tax expenditures persist.” 
10 Surrey, “Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy” supra note 6 at 725-26. 
11 Ibid. at 720-25, acknowledging (at 723), however, that a tax incentive delivered through a refundable flat 
rate credit would not be subject to this criticism. 
12 Surrey and McDaniel, supra note 4 at 25-27 and 69-98. 
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Consequently, as the U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation explains in a recent 
review of tax expenditure analysis, Surrey intended that the concept would serve two 
normative purposes.13 First, by subjecting tax expenditures to the same kind of legislative 
scrutiny that is traditionally accorded to direct spending programs, Surrey hoped that the 
concept would lead to greater control over government spending.14 Second, by 
identifying various so-called “tax provisions” as spending programs, Surrey also hoped 
that the concept would promote effective tax reform, as policymakers would recognize 
that these provisions violated basic tax policy principles of equity, efficiency, and 
administrative simplicity.15 
In the years since Surrey formulated the notion of a tax expenditure, the concept 
has had mixed success as a stimulus to legislative reform. While U.S. and Canadian 
governments have produced regular tax expenditure reports in order to enhance the 
visibility and potential legislative scrutiny of these measures,16 the number of tax 
expenditures in the U.S. income tax has actually increased over the last 35 years,17 
though it is impossible to confirm a similar trend from Canadian reports.18 As an impetus 
                                                
13 U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation, A Reconsideration of Tax Expenditure Analysis, (May 12, 2008) at 2-
3. 
14 As the Joint Committee explains, “once tax expenditures were identified and clearly displayed as 
government spending substitutes, subsequent dissection would reveal them to be poorly targeted or 
inefficient, when compared either to an actual government spending program, or (in most cases) when 
compared to not expending government resources at all.” Ibid. at 2-3. 
15 Ibid. at 3.  
16 In the U.S., Congress has published annual tax expenditure budgets since 1968. The federal Government 
in Canada produced its first tax expenditure report in 1979. Department of Finance Canada, Government of 
Canada Tax Expenditure Account: A Conceptual Analysis of Tax Preferences in the Federal Income and 
Commodity Tax Systems, (December 1979). For Canadian tax expenditure reports from 1995 to 2008, see 
http://www.fin.gc.ca/purl/taxexp-eng.asp (last accessed 23 October 2009). 
17 U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 13 at 4, reporting that the number of federal income tax 
expenditures identified by the Joint Committee has increased from 60 in 1972 to 170 in 2007. 
18 Although the 1979 report stated that tax expenditures “have been growing more rapidly in recent years 
than direct spending in a number of areas,” similar statements do not appear in more recent reports, and it is 
difficult to distinguish differences in the reporting of tax expenditures from increases in their number or 
estimated amounts. 
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to legislative reform, therefore, one might be tempted to conclude that tax expenditure 
analysis has been an abject failure. At the same time, however, tax expenditure analysis 
has had a considerable effect on the design of tax expenditures, as these are increasingly 
delivered in the form of credits rather than deductions or exemptions,19 are often 
temporary in nature,20 and are occasionally subject to budgetary ceilings.21 As a result, 
while tax expenditure analysis may not have reduced the number of tax expenditures, it 
appears to have had considerable influence on tax policy and tax reform,22 and may yet 
have some influence on public spending as a result of legislative sunsets and budgetary 
ceilings. 
This paper examines a particular category of tax expenditures in Canada, namely 
tax expenditures that are designed to limit the growth of carbon emissions that contribute 
to global warming. Unlike the U.S., which relies heavily on tax expenditures as 
instruments of energy and climate change policy,23 Canada has introduced very few such 
tax expenditures, relying instead on voluntary initiatives, direct subsidies, and limited 
regulatory measures to limit carbon emissions.24 As background to this inquiry, Part II 
reviews Canadian experience with carbon emissions over the last two decades and the 
limited government response to this growing problem. Part III identifies the most 
                                                
19 In Canada, for example, the deduction for charitable contributions was converted into a credit in 1988. 
See David G. Duff, “Charitable Contributions and the Personal Income Tax: Evaluating the Canadian 
Credit,” in Jim Phillips, Bruce Chapman, and David Stevens, eds., Between State and Market: Essays on 
Charities Law and Policy in Canada, (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001) 407. 
20 See, e.g., Victor Thuronyi, “Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment,” [1988] Duke L.J. 1155 at 1171, 
observing that the “sunsetting” of several tax expenditure provisions “suggests that Congress has partially 
accepted the argument in favor of treating tax expenditures like spending programs for the purposes of 
budgetary review.” 
21 See the discussion of U.S. climate change tax expenditures in Janet E. Milne, “Climate Change Tax 
Expenditures in the US Tax Code: A Tax Expenditure Microcosm With Environmental Dimensions” 
(2009). 
22 Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 13 at 6. 
23 Milne, supra note 21. 
24 For a critical review of Canadian climate change policy, see Jeffrey Simpson, Marc Jaccard and Nic 
Rivers, Hot Air: Meeting Canada’s Climate Change Challenge, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2007).  
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prominent tax expenditures that Canadian governments have introduced in order limit the 
growth of carbon emissions. Part IV evaluates these tax expenditures as spending 
programs and tax measures. Part V concludes. 
II. Background 
Canada ratified the Kyoto Protocol on December 17, 2002, legislatively affirming 
the commitment that the federal Government made at the negotiating table five years 
earlier to reduce Canada’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 6% from the 1990 level 
of 592 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent (CO2e) emissions.25 Notwithstanding this 
commitment, however, GHG emissions in Canada increased substantially in the 1990s 
and 2000s – reaching 747 million tonnes in 2007, which was 26.2% higher than the 1990 
level and 33.8% higher than Canada’s commitment under the Kyoto Protocol.26 
Although economic and population and economic growth contributed 
significantly to GHG emissions during this period,27 other countries have managed 
impressive growth rates without corresponding increases in GHG emissions,28 suggesting 
                                                
25 On the unrealistic and highly political nature of this commitment, which was designed to ensure that 
promised emissions reductions in Canada would be slightly better than those promised by the United 
States, see ibid. at 33-41. 
26 Environment Canada, Information on Greenhouse Gas Sources and Sinks: Canada’s 2007 Greenhouse 
Gas Inventory – A Summary of Trends, online at http://www.ec.gc.ca/pdb/ghg/inventory_report/2007/som-
sum_eng.cfm (last accessed 23 October 2009). While GHG emissions actually decreased in some sectors 
such as pulp and paper manufacturing, construction, coal mining, chemicals and metal production, 
increases were significant for electricity and heat generation (24.2%), fossil fuel industries (32%), 
commercial and institutional buildings (36.8%), transportation (37.5%), and fugitive emissions from oil 
(39.1%), natural gas (64.8%) and venting (64.8%), and particularly high for mining and oil and gas 
extraction (276.4%) – reflecting development of the Alberta tar sands. Ibid. at 6. 
27 See ibid. at 2- 3 (reporting that Canada’s gross domestic product and population grew by roughly 60 
percent and 20 percent respectively between 1990 and 2007). See also Simpson, et. al., supra note 1 at 80-
83 (explaining that Canada’s GHG emissions would have increased only 6 percent from 1990 to 2005 if the 
country had experienced the same rates of population and economic growth as European countries 
experienced during this period). 
28 In Sweden, for example, carbon emissions decreased by almost 9% between 1990 and 2006, despite 
economic growth of 44% over this period. Gwladys Fouché, “Sweden’s carbon-tax solution to climate 
change puts it top of the green list,” guardian.co.uk (29 April 2008), online at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/apr/29/climatechange.carbonemissions  Likewise, Denmark 
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that public policies have also played a role. Indeed, despite numerous Green Plans and 
Climate Change Action Plans in the late 1990s and early 2000, the federal government 
has consistently failed to introduce measures that would impose a market price on carbon 
emissions, relying instead on “pious hopes and good intentions”29 backed up by 
exhortations to voluntary action, government commitments to satisfy energy 
requirements from renewable sources, and the introduction of selected tax incentives and 
direct spending measures.30 
Unlike the U.S. Government, however, the federal Government in Canada has 
tended to rely more on direct expenditures than tax expenditures to encourage 
investments and activities to limit carbon emissions.31 For example, while the U.S. 
Internal Revenue Code provides a production tax credit for each kilowatt hour of 
electricity sold during the first ten years that a windfarm is in service,32 the Canadian 
government provides a similar fiscal subsidy directly in the form of a Wind Power 
Production Incentive (WPPI) and a successor program called ecoENERGY for 
Renewable Power.33 Likewise, while the Internal Revenue Code provides tax credits for 
                                                                                                                                            
managed to reduce carbon emissions by 8.3% between 1990 and 2008, despite sustained economic growth 
during this period. Danish Energy Agency, “Large drop in energy consumption and CO2 emissions in 
2008” (18 March 2009), online at http://www.sparenergi.dk/sw80769.asp. 
29 Simpson, et. al., supra note 21 at 87. 
30 Although the current federal Government introduced a “regulatory framework” in 2007 promising to 
limit emissions at large industrial facilities, the cap and trade regime contemplated under this framework 
has yet to be put into place and involves intensity-based targets that would limit emissions per unit of 
output but permit overall emissions to increase. See Government of Canada, Regulatory Framework for Air 
Emissions, (2007), available at http://www.ec.gc.ca/doc/media/m_124/report_eng.pdf; and Government of 
Canada, Ecoaction: Action on Climate Change and Air Pollution, (2007) at 4, available at 
http://www.ec.gc.ca/doc/media/m_124/brochure/brochure_eng.pdf (“[A] company will have to cut its 
greenhouse gas emissions per unit of production by 18% by 2010 [and] a further 2% in each and every year 
after 2010”). 
31 For a useful summary of these fiscal measures, see Anuschka Bakker, ed., Tax and the Environment: A 
World of Possibilities, Amsterdam: IBFD, 2009) at 138-62. 
32 IRC, § 45.  
33 The Wind Power Production Incentive was introduced in 2001 and continues to apply to projects 
installed up to the end of March 2007. The ecoEnergy for Renewable Power program applies for projects 
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residential energy efficiency,34 the Canadian Government provides direct grants to 
encourage energy efficiency in residential, commercial and industrial buildings through 
its ecoEnergy Retrofit program.35 Other direct grant programs to support clean and 
renewable energy include: the federal Government’s ecoENERGY Technology Initiative, 
which funds research, development and demonstration to support the development of the 
next-generation clean-energy technologies such as carbon sequestration36; ecoEnergy for 
Renewable Heat, which offers financial incentives to the industrial, commercial and 
institutional sectors to install active energy-efficient solar air and/or water heating 
systems37; and ecoEnergy for Biofuels, which provides operating incentives to producers 
of renewable alternatives to gasoline and diesel.38 
Provincial governments in Canada have been similarly reluctant to adopt 
aggressive measures to limit carbon emissions, and have also relied on tax incentives and 
spending measures for this purpose. Like the federal Government, provincial 
Governments in Canada have also tended to rely more on direct spending programs than 
tax expenditures when introducing fiscal subsidies to encourage reductions in carbon 
                                                                                                                                            
installed between April 2007 through March 2011. Government of Canada, “ecoEnergy for Renewable 
Power” online at http://ecoaction.gc.ca/ecoenergy-ecoenergie/power-electricite/index-eng.cfm (last 
accessed 24 October 2009). For a detailed discussion of the WPPI, see David G. Duff and Andrew Green, 
“Wind Power in Canada” in Kurt Deketelaere, Hope Ashiabor, Larry Kreiser, and Janet Milne, eds., 
Critical Issues in Environmental Taxation, Vol. IV, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 3. 
34 IRC, §§ 45L, 25C and 45M. For a detailed discussion, see Janet E. Milne, “From Simple Concept to 
Complex Reality: U.S. tax Incentives to Reduce Household Use of Fossil Fuels” in Jacqueline Cottrell, 
Hope Ashiabor, Larry Kreiser, and Janet Milne, eds., Critical Issues in Environmental Taxation, Vol. VI, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
35 Government of Canada, “ecoEnergy Retrofit” online at http://ecoaction.gc.ca/ecoenergy-
ecoenergie/retrofitsmo-renovationpmo-eng.cfm (last accessed 24 October 2009). 
36 Government of Canada, “ecoEnergy Technology Initiative” online at 
http://www.ecoaction.gc.ca/ecoenergy-ecoenergie/technology-technologie-eng.cfm (last accessed 24 
October 2009). 
37 Government of Canada, “ecoEnergy for Renewable Heat” online at http://ecoaction.gc.ca/ecoenergy-
ecoenergie/heat-chauffage/index-eng.cfm (last accessed 24 October 2009). 
38 Government of Canada, “ecoEnergy for Biofuels” online at http://ecoaction.gc.ca/ecoenergy-
ecoenergie/biofuelsincentive-incitatifsbiocarburants-eng.cfm (last accessed 24 October 2009). 
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emissions.39 In recent years, however, some provinces have introduced renewable 
portfolio standards (RPSs) and feed-in tariffs (FITs) to encourage the production of 
electricity from renewable sources,40 joined regional cap and trade regimes like the 
Western Climate Initiative,41 and enacted carbon taxes to discourage the emission of 
carbon dioxide.42 While it is too early to assess the impact of these measures in Canada, 
there is considerable evidence that RPSs and FITs have stimulated the development of 
                                                
39 In addition to the federal Government, therefore, several provinces offer direct subsidies for energy 
efficiency in the form of rebates or grants to encourage household purchases of energy-efficient appliances 
and home insulation. See, e.g., Government of Alberta, News Release, “Cash rebates will help Albertans be 
more energy efficient” (April 9, 2009), online at http://alberta.ca/acn/200904/256878B7BE08A-F45B-
8F41-B19FDA5DB0C37E21.html (accessed November 1, 2009) (rebate for homeowners purchasing high 
efficiency furnaces, Energy Star®® clothes washers, and insulation and hot water heaters if purchased 
based on an ecoENERGY evaluation); LiveSmart BC, Government of British Columbia, “Rebates and 
Incentives for Your Home” online at http://www.livesmartbc.ca/homes/incentives.html (accessed 
November 1, 2009) (provincial incentives for improving efficiency of space heating, water heating, home 
insulation, windows and doors, and for purchasing renewable energy generating equipment for 
homeowners participating in federal ecoENERGY program); Manitoba Hydro, “Furnace and Boiler 
Replacement Program” online at http://www.hydro.mb.ca/your_home/furnace_replacement_program.shtml 
(accessed November 1, 2009) ($245 rebate for homeowners replacing furnaces or boilers with high-
efficiency natural gas models); Manitoba Hydro, “Power Smart Home Insulation Program” online at 
http://www.hydro.mb.ca/your_home/home_insulation.shtml (accessed November 1, 2009) (rebate for 
portion of cost of home insulation); Government of Nova Scotia, Nova Scotia EnerGuide for Houses: 
Rebate Guide, (2009) at 1, online at http://www.conservens.ca/resources/energuide/EnerGuide-Rebate-
Guide.pdf (accessed November 1 2009) at 1 (up to $1,500 in rebates for energy improvements to existing 
homes in conjunction with the federal government's retrofit program); Ontario Ministry of Energy and 
Infrastructure, Ontario's Energy Efficiency Resource & Funding Guide, (2009) at 7, online at 
http://www.mei.gov.on.ca/english/pdf/conservation/energy_efficiency_funding.pdf (accessed November 1, 
2009) (matching grants up to $5,000 for payments qualifying for support under the federal ecoEnergy 
Retrofit Program); Agence de l'efficacité énergétique Québec, “Rénoclimat: Financial Assistance” (2009), 
online at http://www.aee.gouv.qc.ca/en/my-home/renoclimat/financial-assistance/#c99 (accessed 
November 1, 2009) (financial assistance for homeowners to improve energy efficiency of their homes); and 
SaskEnergy, Saskatchewan EcoGuide for Homes, (2009), online at 
http://www.saskenergy.com/saving_energy/Grant%20publication.pdf  (accessed November 1, 2009) 
(additional provincial grants for improvements receiving grants under the federal ecoENERGY for Homes 
Retrofit program). As well, British Columbia’s Scrap-It Program provides rebate incentives of up to $1,250 
for owners of inefficient older vehicles to replace their cars with new vehicles, transit passes, or bicycles. 
B.C. Incentive Program, online at http://www.scrapit.ca/PIPindex.htm (accessed November 1, 2009). 
40 See David. G. Duff and Andrew J. Green, “Wind Power in Canada” in K. Deketelaere et. al., eds., 
Critical Issues in Environmental Taxation – International and Comparative Perspectives: Volume IV, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 3. 
41 See Western Climate Initiative (WCI), http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org  (last accessed 23 October 
2009). 
42 The Province of Quebec introduced a low-rate duty on bulk sales of fossil fuels in 2007, and British 
Columbia enacted a broad consumption-based carbon tax effective July 1, 2008. See David G. Duff, 
“Carbon Taxation in British Columbia” (2008), 10 Vt. J. Envtl.L. 87. 
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renewable source electricity in jurisdictions where they have been introduced,43 and that 
emissions trading and carbon taxation have limited the growth of carbon emissions in 
European countries where they have been adopted.44 
III. Identification 
 
The first task of any tax expenditure analysis necessarily involves the 
identification of a particular tax provision as a tax expenditure, rather than an inherent 
element of the relevant tax. Although this initial task might seem relatively 
straightforward, it has provoked fierce debate about the appropriate standard or 
benchmark against which a tax expenditure is defined and caused some commentators to 
question the relevance of tax expenditure analysis altogether. 
In Stanley Surrey’s view, the concept of a tax expenditure was necessarily 
premised on a normative tax base, which he equated with the Haig-Simons-Schantz 
comprehensive income concept in the case of income tax expenditures,45 and a broad-
based concept of consumption in the case of retail sales taxes and value-added taxes.46 
For this reason, he also concluded that it was impossible to identify tax expenditures 
within narrowly-based excise taxes.47 
                                                
43 David G. Duff and Andrew J. Green, “Market-Based Policies for Renewable Energy Source Electricity: 
A Comparative Evaluation” in N. Chalifour et. al., eds., Critical Issues in Environmental Taxation – 
International and Comparative Perspectives: Volume V, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 825. 
44 See, e.g., Mikael Skou Anderson, “Environmental and Economic Implications of Taxing and Trading 
Carbon: Some European Experiences” (2008), 10 Vt. J. Envtl.L 61. 
45 Surrey and McDaniel, supra note 4 at 186. Although often associated with U.S. economists Robert 
Murray Haig and Henry Simons, the concept has a German antecedent in the work of Georg van Schanz. 
See Georg van Schanz, “Der Einkummensbegriff und die Einkommensteuergesetz,”13 Finanz-Archiv no. 1, 
1-87 (1896); Robert Murray Haig, “The Concept of Income – Economic and Legal Aspects,” in R.M. Haig, 
The Federal Income Tax, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1921) 1; and Henry C. Simons, Personal 
Income Taxation: The Definition of Income as a Problem of Fiscal Policy, (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1938). For a useful survey of this “comprehensive” concept of income, see R.A. Musgrave, “In 
Defense of an Income Concept” (1967) 81 Harv. L. Rev. 44. 
46 Surrey and McDaniel, supra note 4 at 238.  
47 Ibid. at 233. 
 10 
Although there has been very little analysis of the tax expenditure concept in the 
context of broad-based sales and value-added taxes or more narrow excise taxes, the 
assumed relationship between tax expenditures and the comprehensive income tax base 
has been subject to considerable criticism, beginning with Boris Bittker in the 1960s,48 
and continuing with more recent objections by Douglas Kahn and Jeffrey Lehman,49 
Bruce Bartlett,50 and Dan Shaviro.51 Moreover, to the extent that the current “income” tax 
constitutes a hybrid system comprising features of a comprehensive income tax base and 
a personal consumption or expenditure tax base,52 it is impossible to characterize 
consumption tax elements as departures from the “normative” tax base without making 
an implicit policy choice in favour of one tax base over another.53 More boldly, David 
Weisbach and Jacob Nussim argue that the substitutability between tax expenditures and 
direct spending programs implies that “[t]here is no such thing as a normative tax base.”54 
As the U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation explains in its recent analysis of the tax 
expenditure concept, the presumed relationship between tax expenditure analysis and the 
comprehensive income tax base has undermined the effectiveness of tax expenditure 
analysis as an impetus to reform by linking this analytical approach to a concept of 
                                                
48 Boris Bittker, “Accounting for Federal ‘Tax Subsidies’ in the National Budget” (1969), 22 National Tax 
Journal 22. See also Bittker’s critique of the comprehensive income concept in Boris I. Bittker, “A 
‘Comprehensive Tax Base’ as a Goal of Tax Reform,” 80 Harv. L. Rev. 925 (1967). 
49 Douglas A. Kahn and Jeffrey S. Lehman, “Tax Expenditure Budgets: A Critical View” (1992), 54 Tax 
Notes 1661. 
50 Bruce Bartlett, “The End of Tax Expenditures as We Know Them?” (2001), 92 Tax Notes 413. 
51 Daniel Shaviro, “Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Language” (2004), 57 Tax L. Rev. 187 at 199, 
criticizing traditional tax expenditure analysis on the basis that it is premised on “a supposedly canonical, 
yet in practice under-theorized and rightly controversial, official definition of the ‘normative income tax 
base.’” 
52 See, e.g., Henry J. Aaron, Harvey Galper, and Joseph A. Pechman, Uneasy Compromise: Problems of a 
Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1988). 
53 See, e.g., Leonard E. Burman, “Is the Tax Expenditure Concept Still Relevant?” (2003), 56 National Tax 
Journal 613 at 618, observing that “[t]here is clearly an ideological element to the [tax expenditure 
analysis] about tax bases” and concluding that “there is no objective way to resolve this dispute”).  
54 David A. Weisbach and Jacob Nussim, “The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs” (2004), 113 
Yale L.J. 955. 
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income that is increasingly contested.55 In contrast, it emphasizes, “[i]f tax expenditure 
analysis is to enjoy broad support, it must be seen as neutral and principled.”56 For this 
reason, drawing on earlier work by Seymour Fiekowsky and other tax scholars,57 the 
Committee suggests that tax expenditure analysis should be limited to a more narrowly 
targeted category of “tax subsidies”,58 which it defines as specific tax provisions that are 
“deliberately inconsistent with an identifiable general rule of the present tax law (not a 
hypothetical ‘normal’ tax)” and that collect less revenue than the general rule.59 In 
addition to its virtue as a more neutral benchmark for tax expenditure analysis, this 
definition is more easily applied not only to broad-based consumption taxes like retail 
sales taxes and value-added taxes, but also to more narrowly targeted excise taxes which 
might also include embedded tax subsidies. 
 With this conceptual introduction, it is now possible to identify the key tax 
expenditures that federal and provincial governments in Canada have introduced in order 
to limit the growth of carbon emissions. For this purpose, we employ the more neutral 
concept of tax subsidies suggested by the U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation, reviewing 
tax measures that deliberately depart from an identifiable general rule within the 
particular and collect less revenue than the general rule. 
                                                
55 Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 13 at 35-38. 
56 Ibid. at 36. 
57 Seymour Fiekowsky, “The Relation of Tax Expenditures to the Distribution of the ‘Fiscal Burden’” 
(1980), 2 Canadian Taxation 211, suggesting that a concept of “tax subsidy programs” be defined by 
reference to general tax rules from which they depart, as well as their ability to be replaced by direct 
expenditure programs. For similar approaches, suggesting that the concept of a tax expenditure be defined 
in terms of its potential replacement by a direct spending program, see Michael J. McIntyre, “A Solution to 
the Problem of Defining a Tax Expenditure” (1980), 14 U.C. Davis Law Review 78; and Thuronyi, supra 
note 20. 
58 Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 13 at 9-11 and 39-42. 
59 Ibid. at 39. 
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1. Federal Income Tax Expenditures 
 
In addition to these direct spending programs, the Canadian Government has also 
relied on tax measures to encourage energy conservation and the development of clean 
and renewable energy as well as the use of public transit. This section examines each of 
these tax measures. 
(1) Accelerated Depreciation 
 Like many tax systems, the Canadian income tax does not permit the immediate 
deduction of capital expenses,60 but allows for the deduction of these capital costs 
through a statutory capital cost allowance (CCA) regime.61 While the rates at which 
various capital assets can be depreciated for tax purposes are generally designed to reflect 
the useful life of these assets, higher rates are sometimes established in order to create a 
special tax incentive to encourage investments in specific classes of property since their 
costs can be deducted over a shorter period of time. As these accelerated depreciation 
rates are deliberately more generous than general rules for computing CCA and are 
deliberately designed to encourage specific kinds of investments, they are readily 
characterized as tax expenditures under the approach adopted here. Indeed, the 2008 
Federal Budget affirms that accelerated CCA is “an explicit exception to the general 
practice of setting CCA rates based on the useful life of assets” and “provides a financial 
benefit by deferring taxation.”62 
                                                
60 Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (as amended), s. 18(1)(b) [hereafter “ITA”]. 
61 Ibid., s. 20(1)(a), and Income Tax Regulations, C.R.C. 1978, c. 945 (as amended), Part XI and Schedule 
II [hereafter “ITR”]. 
62 Department of Finance Canada, The Budget Plan 2008, “Tax Measures: Supplementary Information and 
Notice of Ways and Means Motions” (February 26, 2008) at 297 [hereafter 2008 Federal Budget], online at 
http://www.budget.gc.ca/2008/pdf/plan-eng.pdf. 
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 In Canada, accelerated depreciation for investments in energy efficiency and 
renewable energy has existed in one form or another since 1976, when the federal 
Government introduced CCA Class 34 for equipment designed to recover heat from 
industrial processes or produce heat or electricity from the consumption of wood or 
municipal wastes.63 Deductible at a rate of 50 percent on a straight-line basis rather than 
the usual declining basis used for most capital property,64 the cost of these capital assets 
could be fully deducted over two years – much faster than the expected useful life of the 
property and much faster than the 4 percent declining balance rate that would otherwise 
have applied to these assets under Class 1.65 Extended in 1979 to active solar heating and 
solar energy conversion equipment, generating equipment for small hydro-electric 
stations, and heat recovery equipment,66 and in 1986 to equipment for wind energy 
conversion systems,67 these rules represented a deliberate tax preference intended to 
encourage investments in energy efficiency and renewable energy.68 
While the amount that could be deducted in respect of this class of property was 
limited after 1988 to income from this class determined in order to prevent the use of this 
accelerated depreciation to shelter other income,69 these “specified energy property” rules 
specifically excluded corporations whose principal business was “the sale, distribution or 
production of electricity, natural gas, oil, steam, heat or any other form of energy or 
                                                
63 ITR, Sch. II, Cl. 34(d). 
64 Ibid., s. 1100(1)(y) (for taxation years commencing before 12 November 1981)and s. 1100(1)(t) (for 
taxation years ending after 12 November 1981).  
65 Ibid., Sch. II, Cl. 1(m) (electrical energy generating and distributing equipment) and (p) (heat production 
and distributing equipment). 
66 Ibid., Sch. II, Cl. 34(e)((i)-(iv).  
67 Ibid., Sch. II, Cl. 34(e)(v).  
68 See, e.g., 2008 Federal Budget, supra note 62 at 297, explaining that the incentive for this investment “is 
premised on the environmental benefits of low-emission or no-emission energy generation equipment.” 
69 Ibid., ss. 1100(24)-(29). 
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potential energy.”70 As a result, these “principal business corporations” can use 
accelerated depreciation resulting from investments in renewable energy and energy 
conservation equipment to shelter other kinds of income – another tax expenditure for 
these kinds of investments, given the general rules limiting the deduction of CCA for this 
purpose. 
Although the federal government reduced the CCA rate for energy conservation 
and renewable energy equipment in 1994 by eliminating additions to Class 34 and 
including this type of property in new Class 43.1 with a declining balance rate of 30 
percent,71 this reduced rate continued to be much more generous than the standard 4 
percent rate under Class 1,72 and was generally more generous than depreciation rates 
used for accounting purposes.73 At the same time, moreover, the federal Government 
expanded the kinds of property that could qualify for CCA under this accelerated rate,74 
adding the following categories to Class 43.1: fixed location photovoltaic equipment used 
for generating electricity from solar energy,75 above-ground geothermal energy 
equipment used primarily to generate electricity,76 above-ground equipment used 
                                                
70 Ibid., s. 1100(26). 
71 Canada Tax Service, Canadian Federal Budget (February 22, 1994): Budgetary Proposals of the 
Minister of Finance, the Hon. Paul Martin, with Commentary by Stikeman, Elliot, (Scarborough, Ont.: 
Carswell Thompson Professional Publishing, 1994) at 3-24 [hereafter 1994 Federal Budget]. See ITR, s. 
1100(1)(a)(xxix.1) and Sch. II, Cl. 43.1(a)(i) and (ii) and (c)(i) (equipment for generating electricity and 
heat from waste fuel), (d)((i)(I) (active solar heating equipment), (d)(ii) and (iii.1) (small hydro-electric 
stations),  (d)(iv) (heat recovery equipment), and (d)(v) (wind energy generating equipment). As well, 
unlike Class 34, Class 43.1 is not exempt from the so-called “half-year rule” in ITR, s. 1100(2), which 
limits the amount that may be deducted in respect of net additions to the capital cost of any class in a 
taxation year to half of this net addition. 
72 Supra note 65. 
73 Department of Finance Canada, Budget 1997: Budget Plan Including Supplementary Information and 
Notices of Ways and Means Motions, (February 18, 1997) at 208 [hereafter 1997 Federal Budget], online at 
http://www.fin.gc.ca/budget97/binb/bp/bp97e.pdf. 
74 1994 Federal Budget, supra note 71. 
75 ITR, Sch. II, Cl. 43.1(d)(vi). 
76 Ibid., Cl. 43.1(d)(vii). 
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primarily to collect landfill gas or digester gas,77 and equipment used primarily to 
generate heat from the consumption of wood waste, municipal waste, landfill gas or 
digester gas, if the heat energy is used directly in an industrial process.78 
Since 1994, the federal Government has continued to expand the scope of Class 
43.1 property in the following ways: reducing the peak capacity requirements for eligible 
photovoltaic equipment in 199779; allowing electrical generating equipment using gas 
that would otherwise be flared during production of crude oil to qualify in 199980; 
increasing the maximum annual rated capacity for small hydro-electric stations to 
accommodate run-of-the-river projects in 200181; adding qualifying fuels cells,  
equipment to produce bio-oil from wood waste or other plant residues, and specified 
equipment to generate heat from solar energy, wood and municipal waste, landfill gas or 
digester gas for use in a greenhouse operation in 200382; extending eligibility for active 
solar heating equipment, photovoltaic and fuel cell systems, and adding equipment to 
generate electricity using wave or tidal energy in 200783; and extending eligibility for 
waste-to-energy applications and adding ground source heat pump systems and biogas 
                                                
77 Ibid., Cl. 43.1(d)(viii). 
78 Ibid., Cl. 43.1(d)(ix). 
79 1997 Federal Budget, supra note 73 at 211.  
80 Department of Finance Canada, The Budget Plan 1999 Including Supplementary Information and Notices 
of Ways and Means Motions, (February 16, 1999) at 215-216, online at 
http://www.fin.gc.ca/budget99/bp/bp-eng.asp. 
81 Department of Finance Canada, The Budget Plan 2001, Supplementary Information and Notices of Ways 
and Means Motions Included, (December 10, 2001) at 223, online at 
http://www.fin.gc.ca/budget01/pdf/bpe.pdf. 
82 Department of Finance Canada, The Budget Plan 2003, Supplementary Information and Notices of Ways 
and Means Motions Included, (February 18, 2003) at 338-339, online at 
http://www.fin.gc.ca/budget03/pdf/bp2003e.pdf. For the inclusion of fuel cells and equipment to produce 
bio-fuel, see ITR, Sch. II, Cl. 43.1(d)(xi) and (xii).  
83 Department of Finance Canada, The Budget Plan 2007, (March 19, 2007) at 413-14 [hereafter 2007 
Federal Budget], online at http://www.budget.gc.ca/2007/pdf/bp2007e.pdf. For the inclusion of equipment 
to generate electricity from wave or tidal power, see ITR, Sch. II, Cl. 43.1(d)(xiv)  
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production equipment in 2008.84 In 2005, the federal Government also increased the tax 
incentive for investments in renewable energy and energy efficiency by increasing the 
CCA rate for most property qualifying under Class 43.1 to 50 percent on a declining 
balance basis, provided that the property was acquired after February 22, 2005 and before 
2012.85 In 2007, the federal Government extended the qualification period for this higher 
CCA rate to property acquired before 2020.86 According to the 2005 Federal Budget, the 
tax expenditure resulting from increased accelerated depreciation for efficient and 
renewable energy generation equipment was estimated at $20 million in 2005-06, $45 
million in 2006-07, $65 million in 2007-08, $80 million in 2008-09, and $85 million in 
2009-10.87 
(2) Expensing and Flow-Through of Start-up Costs 
 In addition to accelerated depreciation, the federal Government introduced an 
additional tax expenditure for investments in renewable energy and energy efficiency in 
1996 in the form of special tax treatment for Canadian renewable and conservation 
expenses (CRCEs).88 Defined as various start-up expenses incurred in the development of 
a project for which it is reasonable to expect that at least 50 percent of the capital cost of 
                                                
84 2008 Federal Budget, supra note 62 at 298-301. The estimated cost of these changes to the accelerated 
depreciation rules for efficient and renewable energy were estimated as $5 million in 2009-10. Ibid. at 272. 
For the inclusion of ground source heat pumps and biogas production equipment, see ITR, Sch. II, Cl. 
43.1(d)(i) and (xiii). 
85 Canada, Department of Finance, The Budget Plan 2005, (February 23, 2005) at pp. 400-02, online at 
http://www.fin.gc.ca/budget05/pdf/bp2005e.pdf [hereafter 2005 Federal Budget]. See ITR, s. 
1100(1)(xxix.2) and Sch. II, Cl. 43.2. 
86 2007 Federal Budget, supra note 83 at 412. 
87 2005 Federal Budget, supra note 85 at 366 (Table A8.1). 
88 Although the Regulations implementing this measure were not formally adopted until August 23, 2000, 
the special tax treatment available to Canadian renewable and conservation expenses applies to eligible 
expenses incurred after December 5, 1996. P.C. 2000-1331, s. 4, Canada Gazette, Part II (September 13, 
2000). 
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depreciable property will be property described in Class 43.1 or 43.2,89 these expenses 
need not be capitalized (as would otherwise be the case) but may be deducted in the year 
in which they are incurred or carried forward to future taxation years,90 or renounced in 
favour of shareholders who have entered into a flow-through share agreement with a 
qualifying “principal business corporation” that incurs the expense.91 According to the 
1996 Federal Budget in which this category of expenses was announced, the special tax 
treatment was intended to “provide the renewable energy and energy conservation sector 
with improved access to financing in the early stages of their operations when they have 
little or no income to utilize the income tax deductions related to these expenses.”92 The 
estimated cost of this tax expenditure at the time was $5 million in 1997-98 and $10 
million for 1998-99.93 
 Of particular significance for the development of wind power in Canada is the 
subsequent inclusion of “test wind turbines” in the definition of CRCEs. First announced 
in the 1997 Federal Budget,94 the inclusion of this category of expense was also made 
                                                
89 See ITR, s. 1219(1) which specifies various kinds of start-up costs (e.g., service connection costs, costs 
to construct temporary access roads, costs of clearing land, and costs of engineering studies) that qualify as 
Canadian renewable and conservation expenses, and ibid., s. 1219(2) which specifically excludes other 
costs such as the cost of land, the cost of inventory, and deductible costs incurred in respect of the 
administration or management of the taxpayer’s business. 
90 See subsection 66.1(3) of the federal Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985 (5th Supp.), c. 1 (as amended) 
[hereafter ITA], which generally allows a deduction up to the amount of the taxpayer’s “cumulative 
Canadian exploration expense”. See also the definition of “cumulative Canadian exploration expense” in 
ITA subsection 66.1(6) which includes “the total of all Canadian exploration expenses made or incurred by 
the taxpayer before that time” and the definition of “Canadian exploration expense” in ITA subsection 
66.6(6) which includes Canadian renewable and conservation expenses incurred by the taxpayer. 
91 ITA, subsections 66(12.6) to (12.75). See also the definition of a “principal business corporation” in ITA 
subsection 66(15) which includes corporations the principal business of which is the generation of energy 
using Class 43.1 property, or the development of projects for which it is reasonable to expect that at least 
50 percent of the capital cost of depreciable property used in each project would be Class 43.1 property. 
92 Canada, Department of Finance, Budget 1996: Budget Plan Including Supplementary Information and 
Notices of Ways and Means Motions, (March 6, 1996) at p. 171, online at 
http://www.fin.gc.ca/budget96/bp/bp96e.pdf (last accessed October 27, 2009). 
93 Ibid. at 19. 
94 1997 Federal Budget, supra note 73 at 209. 
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retroactive to expenses incurred after December 5, 1996.95 For the purpose of these rules, 
a test wind turbine was initially defined as “the first such device installed at the 
taxpayer’s site for a proposed wind energy conversion system” provided that “the 
primary purpose of the device is to test the level of energy production at the site.”96 After 
representations by the wind energy industry,97 the federal government announced on July 
26, 2002 that it would amend the definition of a test wind turbine to allow more than one 
turbine at each site to qualify as a test wind turbine provided that other criteria were 
satisfied.98 As ultimately adopted, the amended Regulations generally allow for more 
than one test wind turbine for each wind farm project provided that: (1) the wind energy 
produced by these test wind turbines does not exceed 20 percent of the nameplate 
capacity of the wind farm; (2) the project does not share with any other project a point of 
interconnection to an electrical energy transmission or distribution system; (3)  the 
primary purpose of the turbine is to test the level of wind energy produced by the turbine 
at the place of installation; (4) no other turbine is installed within 1,500 metres of the 
turbine; and (5) no other wind energy conversion system is installed within 1,500 metres 
of the turbine until the level of electrical energy produced by the turbine has been tested 
for at least 120 calendar days.99 According to a regulatory impact statement 
accompanying the amended Regulation, “these amendments are expected to encourage 
the development of a domestic wind energy sector.”100 According to the 1997 Budget, the 
                                                
95 ITR, s. 1219((1)(g). 
96 Ibid., s. 1219(3), as it applied before July 26, 2002. 
97 See Department of Finance, Technical Notes, Regulation 1219 (July 26, 2002). 
98 Canada, Department of Finance, “News Release: Federal Government Enhances Renewable Energy Tax 
Incentives” (July 26, 2002). 
99 See ITR, s. 1219(3), added on April 9, 2005. Although generally applicable to expenditures incurred after 
July 25, 2002, the amended rules can also apply to expenses incurred between December 6, 1996 and July 
25, 2002, if the taxpayer files an election to this effect with the revenue authorities. 
100 Canada, Department of Finance, Technical Notes, Regulation 1219 (August 31, 2005). 
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cost of this and other environmental tax expenditures announced in the Budget were 
estimated at $25 million for each of the 1998-99 and 1999-2000 fiscal years.101 
(3) Tax Credit for Transit Passes 
 A third federal tax expenditure to limit carbon emissions was introduced in 2006 
in the form of a tax credit for the cost of public transit passes.102 According to this 
provision, individuals may in computing their federal tax payable deduct a specified 
percentage of the cost of “eligible transit passes” and “eligible electronic payment cards” 
which are attributable to the use of a public commuter transit service purchased during 
the taxation year.103 For the purpose of this provision, the term “eligible transit pass” is 
defined to require an unlimited right of travel for 28 consecutive days or 5 consecutive 
days and 20 out of 28 days, while an “eligible electronic payment card” requires at least 
32 one-way trips during an uninterrupted period of 31 days.104 The specified percentage 
is defined as the lowest marginal tax rate for individuals,105 which is currently 15 percent, 
meaning that individuals may obtain a 15 percent reduction in the net cost of eligible 
transit passes and electronic payment cards. Since the credit is non-refundable, however, 
taxpayers whose incomes are too low to pay any tax after taking into account other 
credits, obtain no benefit from the credit.106 
                                                
101 1997 Federal Budget, supra note 73 at178 (Table A6.1). 
102 ITA, s. 118.02. 
103 Ibid., s.118.02(2). 
104 Ibid., s. 118.02(1). 
105 Ibid., s. 248(1) “appropriate percentage”. 
106 Since the credit can be claimed by an individual’s spouse or parent (in the case of children under age 
19), however, it may have value even if the individual’s income is too low to pay tax. See ibid., s. 
118.02(2) and the definition of “qualifying relation” in s. 118.02(1). 
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 Since commuting expenses are generally not recognized for income tax purposes 
in Canada,107 this provision represents a deliberate departure from the general income tax 
rules and qualifies as a tax expenditure under the approach adopted here. According to 
the federal Government, the goals of the tax credit are “to make transit more affordable, 
reduce traffic congestion and lower greenhouse gas emissions.”108 Initially estimated to 
cost $98 million for 2006, $212 million for 2007, and $228 million for 2008,109 the 
estimated cost of this tax expenditure was subsequently reduced substantially to $40 
million in 2006, $110 million in 2007, $120 million in 2008, $125 million in 2009, and 
$130 million in 2010.110  
2. Provincial Income Tax Expenditures 
 
 Under various tax collection agreements between the federal and provincial 
governments, the federal government has agreed to collect provincial income tax for 
participating provinces that agree to levy their income taxes on the same tax base as the 
federal definition of taxable income. As all provinces but Quebec have entered into a tax 
collection agreement for the collection of personal income tax and all but Quebec and 
Alberta have entered into a tax collection agreement for the collection of corporate 
income tax,111 it follows that all provincial income taxes except those in Quebec and the 
                                                
107 See, e.g., Luks v. M.N.R., [1958] C.T.C.345, 58 D.T.C. 1194 (Ex. Ct.); and Henry v. M.N.R.,[1972] 
C.T.C. 33, 72 D.T.C. 6005 (S.C.C.). 
108 Department of Finance Canada, Tax Expenditures and Evaluations 2006, (Ottawa, 2006) at 14, online at 
http://www.fin.gc.ca/taxexp-depfisc/2006/taxexp2006_e.pdf  
109 Ibid. at 21. 
110 Department of Finance Canada, 2008, Tax Expenditures and Evaluations 2008, (Ottawa, 2008) 
[hereafter 2008 Tax Expenditure Report] at 20, available at http://www.fin.gc.ca/taxexp-
depfisc/2008/Taxexp-depfisc08_eng.pdf. 
111 Until 2009, Ontario also levied its own corporate income tax. In 2006, however, the Ontario and federal 
governments entered into an agreement whereby corporations carrying on business in Ontario would file a 
single return using the federal income tax base beginning in 2009 for taxation years ending after December 
31, 2008. See Department of Finance Canada, “Ontario Business Will Benefit from New Tax Collection 
Agreement” (6 October 2006), online at http://www.fin.gc.ca/n06/06-056-eng.asp. 
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corporate income tax in Alberta provide the same tax expenditures for renewable energy 
and energy conservation as the federal income tax – in the form of accelerated 
depreciation as well as the expensing and flow-through of start-up costs under the 
definition of Canadian renewable and conservation expenses. The additional revenue cost 
of these provincial tax expenditures is not included in federal revenue estimates. 
 In contrast to federal tax expenditures that affect the definition of taxable income, 
federal tax expenditures that are delivered in the form of tax credits are not automatically 
adopted at the provincial level since the tax collection agreements allow provincial 
governments to determine their own tax credits. As a result, it is up to provincial 
governments to decide whether to adopt a tax credit for transit passes like federal tax 
credit. To date, only the Yukon Territory has introduced a similar tax credit,112 though 
Nova Scotia announced that it would also introduce a tax credit for transit passes but 
deferred the introduction of this credit in its 2009 Budget.113 In Quebec, on the other 
hand, the 2006 Budget announced a separate tax incentive for employer-provided transit 
passes, whereby employees would be exempt from tax on reimbursements of transit 
passes and employer-provided transit passes, and employers would receive an additional 
deduction equal to 100 percent of otherwise deductible amounts paid to reimburse 
employees for transit passes or for employer-provided transit passes.114 Explicitly 
introduced “[w]ith a view to promoting sustainable development and fighting climate 
                                                
112 Income Tax Act, Act to Amend (2006) No. 2, S.Y. 2006, c. 11, s. 2(21). 
113 Nova Scotia, Budget Bulletin for the Fiscal Year 2009-2010: Tax Changes and Incentives for Nova 
Scotians, online at http://www.gov.ns.ca/finance/en/home/budget/budgetdocuments/2008_2010.aspx 
(accessed November 1, 2009). 
114 Finance Québec, 2006-2007 Budget, Additional Information on the Budgetary Measures, (March 23, 
2006) at 12-15, online at http://www.budget.finances.gouv.qc.ca/budget/2006-
2007/en/pdf/AdditionnalInfoMeasures.pdf. 
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change,”115 these measures were subsequently enacted as sections 38.1 and 156.8 of 
Quebec's Taxation Act.116 
 In addition to these measures, provinces that have not agreed to a tax collection 
agreement with the federal government have occasionally adopted other tax expenditures 
designed to encourage renewable energy and energy conservation. In November 2002, 
for example the Ontario Government announced that it would introduce a 10-year 
corporate income tax holiday for income from new projects generating electricity from 
clean, alternative and renewable energy sources, and a further incentive for electricity 
generation from alternative and renewable sources in the form of an immediate deduction 
for qualifying assets used to generate this electricity.117  In 2003, the Ontario Government 
announced a further incentive in the form of an additional 100 percent deduction for 
investments in qualifying assets used to generate electricity for a taxpayer’s own use 
from alternative and renewable sources.118 Before these measures were fully 
implemented, however, they were repealed in 2004 after the election of a new Liberal 
Government.119 Under the new tax collection agreement for the collection of corporate 
income tax, moreover, the Ontario Government can no longer offer separate exemptions 
or deductions for alternative and renewable energy. 
3. Sales Tax Expenditures 
                                                
115 Ibid. at 12. 
116 Taxation Act, R.S.Q. c. I-3, Part 2. See also section 156.9, which defines the terms “eligible transit pass” 
and “eligible paratransit pass.” 
117 Electricity Pricing, Conservation and Supply Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 23, s. 2. 
118 Hon. Janet Ecker, Minister of Finance, 2003 Ontario Budget, Budget Papers at 92, online at 
http://www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/budget/ontariobudgets/2003/pdf/papers_all.pdf. 
119 Hon Greg Sorbara, Minister of Finance, 2004 Ontario Budget, Budget Papers at 135, online at 
https://ozone.scholarsportal.info/bitstream/1873/3383/1/243786.pdf. 
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 As with income taxes, broad-based sales taxes are levied both by the federal 
Government and provincial Governments in Canada – with the exception of Alberta, 
which does not levy a provincial sales tax. At the federal level, this sales tax takes the 
form of a 5 percent value-added tax called the Goods and Services Tax. While the 
provinces of New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and Quebec have harmonized 
their sales taxes with the federal GST, other provinces that collect a broad-based sales tax 
continue to collect separate retail sales taxes, though British Columbia and Ontario have 
announced that they will harmonize their broad-based sales taxes with the federal GST 
effective July 1, 2010.120 Although the federal GST and harmonized provincial sales 
taxes do not contain any tax expenditures to reduce carbon emissions, climate-related 
sales tax expenditures have been introduced in British Columbia, Ontario and 
Saskatchewan. 
 In British Columbia, where PST is levied at a rate of 7 percent, the province 
reduces this tax by 50 percent up to a maximum of $10,000 on purchases of hydrogen 
fuel cell buses and alternative fuel buses, and up to a maximum of $5,000 on alternative 
fuel shuttle buses.121 The Province also reduces PST on fuel efficient vehicles by $1,000, 
$1,500 or $2,000, depending on the vehicle type and fuel efficiency,122 and by 100 
percent of PST payable on hybrid electric vehicles up to a maximum reduction of 
                                                
120 Hon. Dwight Duncan, 2009 Ontario Budget, (March 26, 2009) at 108-113, online at 
http://www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/budget/ontariobudgets/2009/papers_all.pdf#page=105; Government of British 
Columbia, “Harmonized Sales Tax” online at http://www.gov.bc.ca/hst/ (accessed November 1, 2009). 
121 LiveSmart BC, Government of British Columbia, “Transportation Rebates and Incentives” online at 
http://www.livesmartbc.ca/transportation/t_rebates.html (accessed November 1, 2009). 
122 Ibid. For a list of vehicles eligible for the PST reduction, see B.C. Ministry of Small Business and 
Revenue, 2009 Fuel Efficient Vehicles Qualifying for a PST Reduction, (updated November 12, 2008), 
online at http://www.livesmartbc.ca/attachments/2009_fuel_efficient_vehicles.pdf (accessed November 1, 
2009). 
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$2,000.123 In addition, the Social Service Tax Act exempts from the provincial sales tax 
“prescribed tangible personal property used for the conservation of energy....”124 
Prescribed items include various types of insulating material125; EnergyStar® qualified 
windows, doors and skylights126;  weather stripping and caulking to prevent heat loss127; 
equipment to generate energy from renewable sources (wind, solar, micro-hydro, and 
tidal)128; EnergyStar® qualified heating systems129; EnergyStar® rated residential 
refrigerators, freezers, and clothes washers130; energy-efficient commercial boilers131; 
conversion kits for internal combustion engines to operate exclusively on electricity132; 
and aerodynamic and anti-idling devices.133 Given British Columbia’s decision to 
harmonize its provincial sales tax with the federal GST, it appears as though these sales 
tax expenditures will terminate at that time.134 
 In contrast to British Columbia, Ontario has opted for a rebate system for 
provincial sales tax, offering  rebates of its 8 percent PST for purchases of: residential 
solar energy systems; residential systems to generate electricity or heat from wind, micro-
hydro electricity or geothermal energy; alternative fuel vehicles, powered by propane, 
electricity or alternative fuels, and hybrid-electric vehicles; and various Energy Star®® 
qualified household appliances that are purchased, rented, or leased between July 20, 
                                                
123 Ibid. 
124 Social Service Tax Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 431, s. 74(e). 
125 Social Service Tax Act Regulations, B.C. Reg. 84/58, ss. 3.20(1)(a), (a.1), (r), (s), and (w). 
126 Ibid., s. 3.20(1)(d). 
127 Ibid., s. 3.20(1)(m). 
128 Ibid., ss. 3.20(1)(n), (o), (p), (q), and (q.1). 
129 Ibid., s. 3.20(2). 
130 Ibid., s. 3.20(2.2). 
131 Ibid., s. 3.20(2.3). 
132 Ibid., s. 3.20(1)(t). 
133 Ibid., ss. 3.20(1)(v) and (v.1). 
134 Although several goods will be either exempt or zero-rated under the harmonized sales tax, none of the 
energy-related items exempt from the current PST are included in this list. See Government of B.C., 
“Harmonized Sales Tax: Rebates and Exemptions” available online at 
http://www.gov.bc.ca/hst/rebates_exemptions.html (accessed November 1, 2009).  
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2007 and August 31, 2009.135 Although Ontario has also decided to harmonize its sales 
tax with the federal GST, there does not appear to be any reason why it cannot continue 
to rebate its share of Harmonized Sales Tax (HST) on goods and services that help to 
reduce carbon emissions. 
 Like Ontario, Saskatchewan introduced a rebate system for energy efficient 
household appliances subject to its 5 percent provincial sales tax in October 2003. In 
April 2005, however, the provincial Government converted this rebate system into a 
point-of-sale exemption.136 As Saskatchewan has no immediate plans to harmonize its 
provincial sales tax with the federal GST, this tax expenditure (unlike those in the B.C. 
sales tax) is not facing immanent termination. 
4. Excise Tax Expenditures 
 In addition to income and sales tax expenditures, federal and provincial 
governments in Canada have also introduced specific excise tax expenditures in order to 
encourage the consumption and production of renewable transport fuels. In 1992, for 
example, the federal Government exempted the ethanol portion of blended gasoline from 
the federal excise tax, which applies at a rate of $0.10 per litre on unleaded gasoline and 
$.0.04 per litre on diesel.137 In 2003, the biodiesel portion of blended diesel was similarly 
exempted.138 Similarly, in British Columbia, which levies a separate motor fuel tax at 
                                                
135 Ontario Ministry of Revenue. Common Retail Sales Tax Rebates and Exemptions for Energy Efficient 
Goods, (November 2008), online at http://www.rev.gov.on.ca/english/taxtips/rst/pdf/04.pdf (accessed 
November 1, 2009). 
136 Sask. Ministry of Finance, “PST Exemption on New Energy-Efficient Household Appliances” 
Information Bulletin, PST-69 (issued December 2003, revised March, 2005), online at 
http://finance.gov.sk.ca/revenue/pst/bulletins/PST-
69%20PST%20Exemption%20on%20New%20Energy%20Efficient%20Household%20Appliances.pdf 
(accessed November 1, 2009).  
137 Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15, s. 23 and Schedule I, ss. 9 and 9.1. 
138 Tara Laan, Todd A. Litman, and Ronald Steenblik. Biofuels – At What Cost? Government Support for 
Ethanol and Biodiesel in Canada, (Geneva: Global Subsidies Initiative (GSI) of the International Institute 
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rates ranging from $0.145 per litre on gasoline and $.0.15 per litre on diesel in rural areas 
to $0.205 per litre on gasoline and $.0.21 per litre on diesel in the greater Vancouver 
area,139 the ethanol portion of a blend with gasoline or diesel fuel is exempt from the tax 
so long if the ethanol portion is between 5 and 25 percent of the total,140 the biodiesel 
portion of a blended with diesel is exempt regardless of its proportion to the total,141 and 
fuel with at least 85 percent ethanol or methanol is exempt from tax entirely.142 Similar 
excise tax exemptions exist in Manitoba and Ontario,143 while the Province of Quebec 
refunds fuel tax paid on biodiesel so long as it was not mixed with another fuel at the 
time acquired.144 
 Although Stanley Surrey argued that tax expenditure analysis was inappropriate 
for excise taxes on the grounds that they are “inherently limited in scope” and “involve 
no normative tax provisions”,145 these exemptions from the normal tax rate applicable to 
transport fuels are easily characterized as tax expenditures under the alternative approach 
recommended by the U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation and adopted here.146 Indeed, their 
basic purpose as tax subsidies is confirmed by recent developments in Canada, as the 
federal Government and several provinces have recently repealed these tax exemptions 
                                                                                                                                            
for Sustainable Development (IISD), April 2009) at 52, online at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/biofuels_subsidies_canada.pdf (accessed november 1, 2009). 
139 Motor Fuel Tax Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c.317, ss. 4, 10, and 12.1. See also B.C. Ministry of Finance, 
“Motor Fuel Tax: Tax Rates” online at 
http://www.sbr.gov.bc.ca/business/Consumer_Taxes/Motor_Fuel_Tax/tax_rates.htm (accessed August 11, 
2009). 
140 Motor Fuel Tax Regulation, B.C. Reg 414/85, s. 52.2(1). 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Motive Fuel Tax Act, C.C.S.M. c. M220, s. 2.1(8); Fuel Tax Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.35, s. 2(3.1). 
144 Fuel Tax Act, R.S.Q., c. T-1. s. 10(b)(v). 
145 Surrey and McDaniel, supra note 4 at 233. 
146 See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text. While it might be inappropriate to characterize the non-
taxation of biofuels under a carbon tax as a tax expenditure to the extent that the tax is intended to apply 
only to fossil fuels, the same cannot be said of exemptions under federal and provincial excise taxes for 
transport fuels, which are not limited in this manner. 
 27 
and replaced them with direct subsidies to producers of renewable gasoline and diesel 
alternatives in order to prevent so-called “subsidy leakage” to non-resident producers.147 
Although British Columbia continues to exempt ethanol and biodiesel from the provincial 
motor fuel tax, similar tax exemptions in Manitoba, Ontario, and at the federal level have 
been replaced with direct subsidies to producers.148 
IV. Evaluation 
 Having identified a particular tax provision as a tax expenditure, the next step in 
tax expenditure analysis involves an evaluation of the provision as a government policy 
instrument. As explained in the introduction, tax expenditures are frequently criticized as 
bad spending policy and bad tax policy – bad spending policy to the extent that they are 
unlimited in duration, lack a budgetary ceiling, subject to little legislative oversight, 
administered by a revenue authority that has little expertise in the specific area addressed 
by the tax expenditure, and poorly targeted; and bad tax policy on the ground that they 
increase the complexity of the tax system, distort economic decisions, necessitate higher 
tax rates to compensate for foregone revenues, and provide upside-down subsidies when 
delivered in the form of deductions or exemptions.149 
 Notwithstanding these criticisms, however, several commentators have defended 
tax expenditures as potentially attractive policy alternatives, so long as they are 
                                                
147 Laan, et. al., supra note 138 at 11.  
148 In Ontario, these direct payments are made under the Ontario Ethanol Growth Fund. Ontario Ministry of 
Agriculture, Food, and Rural Affairs, New Release, “Province Investing in Ontario's Ethanol Producers” 
(July 6, 2007), online at http://www.omafra.gov.on.ca/english/infores/releases/2007/070607.htm (accessed 
August 12, 2009). In Manitoba, volumetric support is paid pursuant to the Ethanol Fund Grant Regulation, 
Man. Reg. 166/2007, s.5. See also, Biofuels Act, C.C.S.M., c.B40, s. 6.4(1). At the federal level, payments 
are made under the ecoEnergy for Biofuels initiative. See Natural Resources Canada. “ecoENERGY for 
Biofuels: Program Overview” online at http://oee.nrcan.gc.ca/transportation/ecoenergy-
biofuels/about.cfm?attr=16 (accessed August 12, 2009). 
149 Supra, notes 6-12 and accompanying text. 
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effectively monitored as de facto spending programs and designed in a manner that is 
consistent with this function and minimizes inequities, inefficiencies, and administrative 
complexity.150 Indeed, to the extent that they incorporate more traditional features of 
direct spending programs and equitably distributed, a tax expenditure may be a better 
way to provide a government subsidy than direct spending since it takes advantage of a 
established mechanism both for obtaining information and economic resources from and 
conveying information and economic resources to economic actors.151 As a result, as 
recent defenders of tax expenditures have emphasized, where criticisms of tax 
expenditures have led to the redesign of these policy instruments, the critics of tax 
expenditures are in, a very real sense, victims of their own success.152 
 From this less critical perspective, the evaluation of a particular tax expenditure 
necessarily involves three questions. First, as with any government subsidy, is there a 
good social or economic reason for the existence of the subsidy? Second, once it is 
decided that there is good reason for a subsidy, is there a good reason to deliver the 
subsidy through the tax system rather than in the form of a direct spending program? And 
third, is the tax expenditure designed in a manner that is effective in achieving its 
purpose, efficient with respect to the cost incurred in terms of foregone revenue, 
equitably distributed, and effectively monitored and controlled? This part of the paper 
addresses each of these questions in the context of Canadian tax expenditures to reduce 
carbon emissions. 
                                                
150 See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, “Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives” 
(1986), 64 Texas L. Rev. 973; and Weisbach and Nussim, supra note 54 at 978 (arguing that it is possible to 
overcome the deficiencies of tax expenditures by designing these measures “to be implemented in the same 
manner as direct expenditures”). 
151 Zelinsky, supra note 150 at 110-12. 
152 Ibid. at 1030. For an excellent account of how U.S. climate change tax expenditures have been designed 
to take account of many of the traditional criticisms of tax expenditures, see Milne, supra note 21. 
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1. Subsidies to Limit Carbon Emissions 
 Beginning with the justification for government subsidies to limit carbon 
emissions, an initial objection to any such subsidy is that it contradicts the “polluter pays 
principle” which requires those who cause environmental damage to bear the costs of this 
damage.153 To the extent that carbon emissions constitute a negative externality that 
imposes social costs on current and future generations, one might reasonably expect that 
the most appropriate policy response to this market failure would involve government 
regulation to limit carbon emissions or taxation requiring those generating carbon 
emissions to face the full costs of the environmental damage that these emissions 
cause.154 From this perspective, it follows, government subsidies to limit carbon 
emissions are a step in the wrong direction, allowing those who are directly responsible 
for carbon emissions to shift the cost of reducing these emissions to society as a whole.155 
 Although these arguments have considerable merit, there are several reasons why 
governments might justifiably subsidize at least some activities that help limit and reduce 
carbon emissions. First, to the extent that specific activities generate public benefits in 
addition to those enjoyed by the persons engaging in the activities, economic analysis 
suggests that a subsidy may be appropriate to encourage an efficient quantity of these 
activities with positive externalities.156 For this reason, governments often subsidize 
research and development of new products and processes, the benefits from which are 
                                                
153 See , e.g., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Economic Instruments for 
Environmental Protection, (Paris: OECD, 1989) at 27 (“the polluter should bear the cost of measures to 
reduce pollution decided upon by public authorities to ensure that the environment is in an acceptable 
state”). 
154 See, e.g., Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007) at 335-57 (discussing the respective merits of regulatory cap-and-trade regimes and carbon taxes as 
policy instruments to establish a market price for carbon emissions). 
155 See, e.g., Milne, supra note 21. 
156 See, e.g., Zelinsky, supra note 150 at 105-08. 
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often enjoyed by third parties as well as whose engaging in the research and 
development. For the same reason, governments might also reasonably subsidize both 
research and development aimed at reducing carbon emissions as well as forms of 
production and consumption leading to a reduced carbon footprint.157 Similarly, to the 
extent that subsidies increase both the supply of and the demand for new products and 
technologies, they can foster dynamic efficiencies that lessen the costs of these products 
and technologies as markets expand and mature.158 
 Second, government subsidies to limit carbon emissions can serve an 
informational and educational function, heightening awareness about low-carbon 
activities and products and encouraging behavioural changes that contribute to reductions 
in carbon emissions.159 Although governments and non-governmental organizations may 
also encourage emissions reductions through information campaigns and product ratings, 
subsidies can function as tangible signals that reinforce these environmental messages. 
As a result, it is not surprising that governments routinely subsidize the purchases of 
appliances and automobiles that satisfy standards of energy efficiency. 
 Third, to the extent that governments have subsidized or currently subsidize 
activities that contribute to the emission of carbon dioxide, such as road transportation or 
the production of oil and gas,160 subsidies for low-carbon alternatives such as public 
transportation and renewable energy may be necessary to counteract other market 
distortions so that low carbon alternatives can compete fairly. Although elimination of 
                                                
157 See, e.g., J. Andrew Hoerner, Harnessing the Tax Code for Environmental Protection: A Survey of State 
Initiatives, (Washington, D.C.: Center for a Sustainable Economy, 1998) at 18. 
158 Ibid. 
159 David G. Duff, “Tax Policy and Global Warming” (2003), 51 Can. Tax J. 2063 at 2079-80. 
160 For a discussion of current subsidies for the production of oil and gas in Canada, see Mark S. Winfield  
and Amy Taylor, Tax expenditures and environmental sustainability in Canada: Two case studies in 
perverse subsidization” (2009). 
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subsidies for high-carbon activities would contribute greatly to this policy goal, the 
continuing legacy of earlier subsidies might well require compensatory measures to 
create a genuinely level playing field.  
 A fourth rationale for government subsidies to limit carbon emissions questions 
the extent to which the traditional polluter pays principle should apply in the context of 
climate change policy. On the contrary, to the extent that the environmental consequences 
of increasing carbon emissions over the last 200 years is a regrettable and unintended 
consequence of economic development during this period,161 it follows that the costs of 
minimizing carbon emissions at this point in time should be shared widely among those 
who will benefit from reduced emissions, rather than imposed solely on those whose 
actions contribute most to current emission levels. For this reason, while taxes and 
regulatory measures may be essential policy measures to encourage reductions in carbon 
emissions, government subsidies to ease the transition to a low-carbon economy may be 
essential to the overall fairness of government policy in this area. 
 Finally, as a practical matter, it may be politically difficult for a government to 
successfully introduce the kinds of regulatory and tax measures that are apt to encourage 
significant reductions in carbon emissions.162 For this reason as well, therefore, subsidies 
may be one of the few politically feasible methods to encourage emissions reductions. 
2. Tax-Delivered Subsidies 
 Even if it is possible to justify government subsidies to limit carbon emissions, it 
does not follow that these should be delivered through the tax system in the form of tax 
                                                
161 Duff, supra note 159 at 2070. 
162 See the discussion of President Clinton’s failed energy tax in Janet Milne, “Carbon Taxes in the United 
States: The Context for the Future” (2009), 10 V J. Envtl. L. 1; and the discussion of the Liberal Party’s 
“Green Shift” program in the 2008 federal election campaign in Canada in Duff, supra note 42. 
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expenditures rather than as direct grants. On the contrary, given the traditional criticisms 
of tax expenditures as bad spending policy and bad tax policy,163 one might reasonably 
presume that government subsidies should generally be delivered through direct spending 
programs rather than tax expenditures. 
 Notwithstanding this general presumption, however, tax expenditures may be a 
less costly way to deliver government subsidies than direct spending programs  to the 
extent that they employ an established mechanism for allocating economic resources and 
for communicating information about government policy.164 Rules for accelerated 
depreciation and expensing of capital costs, for example, are based on well-established 
tax rules for recognizing the cost of capital assets in computing income, and can be 
delivered with little additional administrative cost except that associated with the 
classification of qualifying assets for the purposes of these tax expenditures. Similarly, 
sales and excise tax expenditures to encourage emissions reductions utilize well-
established government policy instrument that can be employed with little additional 
administrative cost to modify relative prices and communicate information about low-
carbon products and fuels. Although administration of the federal government’s transit 
pass tax credit likely involves greater administrative costs on the part of the government 
and certainly involves increased compliance costs on the part of individual taxpayers, 
even it takes advantage of an established system of allocating government costs and 
benefits. As a result, it is impossible to reject any of these tax expenditures without 
considering their actual design.  
3. Tax Expenditure Design 
                                                
163 See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text. 
164 See, e.g., Zelinsky, supra note 150 at 1010-12. 
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 Turning to the design of Canadian tax expenditures to limit carbon emissions, 
however, there are several reasons to question these measures. Beginning with 
accelerated capital cost allowance and special tax treatment for CRCEs, the first 
objection is that these measures take the form of deductions in computing net income 
rather than refundable tax credits, thereby favouring large and profitable taxpayers that 
can make immediate use of these measures.165 While the ability to flow-through CRCEs 
to investors is designed to alleviate limitations on the deductibility of these expenses, 
these rules merely permit an upside-down subsidy to be shifted to the investor level and 
contain a further bias to the extent that the ability to flow-through expenses is limited to 
corporations whose principal business is either the generation of energy using qualifying 
depreciable property or the development of projects for which it is reasonable to expect 
that at least 50 percent of the capital cost of depreciable property is for qualifying 
depreciable property.166 
 In addition to this objection, it is also worth noting that these tax expenditures do 
not attempt distinguish between investments that might have been undertaken without 
these incentives and investments that are stimulated by these incentives, thereby 
increasing the likelihood that they provide windfall benefits to taxpayers who would have 
undertaken these investments regardless of the incentive. Although it may be practically 
difficult to design a tax expenditure to incorporate such a distinction, one possibility 
                                                
165 This bias is accentuated by exempting “principal business corporations” from the specified energy 
property rules – thereby encouraging taxpayers to invest in renewable energy and energy conservation 
through these enterprises. 
166 Supra  note 91 and accompanying text. 
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might be limit these tax expenditures to additional investments above a base amount 
established by the taxpayer’s investments in previous taxation years.167 
 As well, it is particularly objectionable that Canadian tax expenditure reports 
consistently fail to clearly account for these tax expenditures, reporting the cost of all 
accelerated depreciation (not only for investments in renewable energy and energy 
conservation equipment) as “not available” despite some estimates of projected foregone 
revenue in Federal Budgets, and failing to distinguish flow-though share treatment for 
CRCEs from other flow through arrangements.168 
 Finally, there is very little evidence that accelerated depreciation and other tax 
measures to allow for the immediate expensing or flow-through of qualifying 
expenditures has had much effect on the rate of investment in renewable energy or energy 
conservation, which appears to have been driven more by measures such as renewable 
portfolio standards and feed-in-tariffs that increase the demand for these investments than 
it has by measures reducing the cost of these investments.169 Indeed, the federal 
Government itself recognizes the uncertain effectiveness of these measures to encourage 
renewable energy and energy conservation, acknowledging in a Regulatory Impact 
Analysis Statement accompanying amendments to the scope of Class 43.1 property in 
2000 that: 
The benefits of the Canadian renewable and conservation expense and Class 43.1 
Regulations are difficult to quantify. To the extent that the measures encourage 
development of a successful domestic renewable energy and energy conservation 
sector, significant environmental benefits will accrue in the form of reduced 
                                                
167 See, e.g., Zelinsky, supra note 150 at 1010. 
168 See, e.g., 2008 Tax Expenditure Report, supra note 110. 
169 See, e.g., Janet L. Sawin, “National Policy Instruments: Policy Lessons for the Advancement & 
Diffusion of Renewable Energy Technologies Around the World,” International Conference for Renewable 
Energies, (Bonn, January 2004) at 2, available at http://www.renewables2004.de/pdf/tbp/TBP03-
policies.pdf (concluding that demand-pull measures like RPSs and FITs have been more effective than 
supply-push measures like subsidies in encouraging the diffusion of renewable energy). 
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greenhouse gas emissions and reduced reliance on fossil fuels. Tangible economic 
benefits of renewable energy are many years away, given that this industry is still 
in the development stage.170 
 
As a result, one might reasonably question the merits of accelerated depreciation and 
flow-through rules as ways to encourage renewable energy and energy conservation. 
 Turning to tax expenditures for transit passes, the traditional criticism about 
upside-down subsidies may also be levied against the non-taxation of employer-provided 
or reimbursed transit passes in Quebec as well as the additional deduction for employer-
provided or reimbursed transit passes.171 As well, although it might be argued that 
employer control over access to these tax expenditures might help target the incentive to 
employees who would not otherwise use public transit, it is also likely that employers and 
employees will obtain a windfall simply by shifting from taxable to non-taxable 
compensation in the form of tax-free and double-deductible transit passes without 
significantly shifting employee behaviour. Like accelerated depreciation, therefore, this 
tax expenditure is poorly targeted to influence behaviour at the margin. The same 
criticism may also be directed at the federal transit tax credit, which does not depend on 
any measure of increased ridership, and is therefore apt to provide a windfall to transit 
riders who would have purchased passes without the tax expenditure. Moreover, although 
this tax expenditure is delivered in the form of a tax credit, the credit is not refundable, as 
a result of which effective access to the credit depends on claimants having enough tax 
                                                
170 Regulations Amending the Income Tax Regulations (Capital Cost Allowance — Energy Conservation 
Equipment and Alternative Energy Sources), P.C. 2005-2287 (December 6, 2005), Regulatory Impact 
Analysis Statement, online at http://www.gazette.gc.ca/archives/p2/2005/2005-12-28/html/sor-dors415-
eng.html. 
171 Supra notes 114-116 and accompanying text. 
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payable after deducting other credits against which the transit tax credit may be offset.172 
A final deficiency involves the compliance burden on taxpayers, who must maintain 
receipts for qualifying transit passes purchased during the year and claim the credit well 
after these passes have been purchased in filing their tax returns for the relevant taxation 
year. For this reason as well, therefore, one might reasonably question the merits of the 
federal transit tax credit. 
 Finally, Canadian sales and excise tax expenditures to limit the growth of carbon 
emissions may also be criticized on the grounds that they have been subject to little 
legislative scrutiny, are not well targeted to affect marginal behaviour, and are of 
uncertain effectiveness. As provincial governments in Canada do not produce regular tax 
expenditure reports, there is no ongoing accounting of these tax expenditures in order to 
assess their costs in terms of foregone revenue against their expected benefits. Nor is it 
apparent that reduced sales or excise taxes on energy efficient appliances or renewable 
fuels actually encourage enough additional consumption to justify the revenue losses 
attributable to these tax expenditures, as consumers may simply obtain a windfall for 
purchases that they would have made in any event. Nor is it clear that increased 
purchases of energy-efficient appliances and biofuels necessarily reduce emissions of 
carbon dioxide, as consumers may use energy-efficient appliances (like dishwashers) 
more frequently, and there is increasing evidence that subsidies to the consumption of 
biofuels is a costly and environmentally questionable way to reduce carbon emissions.173 
                                                
172 Indeed, the main reason why revenue estimates for this tax expenditure have decreased so significantly 
since the transit tax credit was introduced in 2006 is because personal tax credits were increased, causing a 
larger number of taxpayers to have too little tax payable against which the credit could be offset. See supra 
notes 108-09 and accompanying text and 2008 Tax Expenditure Report, supra note 110 at 25, note 48. 
173 Laan, et. al., supra note 138 at 4 (questioning the alleged environmental benefits of biofuel production) 
and 78 (questioning the cost-effectiveness of biofuel production).  
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As a result, although Canadian sales and excise tax expenditures may be relatively simple 
to administer and comply with and cannot be criticized on the grounds that they provide 
upside-down subsidies, they are vulnerable to the criticism that they represent bad 
spending policy. 
V. Conclusion 
 This paper has endeavoured to identify and evaluate the most significant tax 
expenditures aimed at limiting the growth of carbon emissions in Canada. Reviewing the 
concept of tax expenditures, it began by questioning Stanley Surrey’s original 
formulation linking the concept income tax expenditures to the Schantz-Haig-Simons tax 
concept of income and rejecting the notion of excise tax expenditures,174 favouring 
instead the approach favoured by the U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation which limits tax 
expenditure analysis to a more narrowly defined category of tax subsidies which are 
deliberately inconsistent with an identifiable general rule of the tax legislation and collect 
less revenue than the general rule.175 On this basis, it identified several federal and 
provincial tax expenditures aimed at reducing the growth of carbon emissions, and 
evaluated these measures as spending programs and tax provisions. 
While this paper does not reject the use of tax expenditures as a policy instrument 
to limit the growth of carbon emissions out of hand, it has serious reservations about the 
merits of current federal and provincial tax expenditures for this purpose. If Canadian 
governments are to continue to utilize tax expenditures to help fight climate change, they 
should pay closer attention to the insights of tax expenditure analysis and design these 
policy instruments accordingly. 
                                                
174 Supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. 
175 Supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text. 
